We extend previous estimates of the average marginal tax rate from the federal individual income tax to include social security. Our computations consider the tax rates on employers, employees, and the self-employed; the income that accrues to persons with earnings below the ceiling; and the effective deductibility of employers' social security contributions from workers' taxable income. The parts of the tax differ because the employer's payments are not counted as part of the employee's taxable income; and (d) an individual's future social security benefits depend positively on that person's history of contributions. The last element reduces the effective tax rate that an individual faces. In fact, Gordon (1982) argues that this consideration is important for people who are close to retirement age. Generally, the inclusion of this effect would require forecasts of benefit schedules as well as survival probabilities. It would also be necessary to include various complexities of the social security law, such as the declining marginal effect of past covered earnings on benefits, the exclusion of some years of earnings from the formula, and the treatment of spouses and dependents. In any event, our subsequent calculations do not take account of the effects of social security contributions on future benefits. Thus, by including only the tax aspects of these "contributions," we somewhat overstate the effective marginal tax rates from the social security program.
I. Theoretical Considerations
Let Sf be the social security tax rate (marginal and average) paid by a firm on workers' earnings. If profits are taxed at the rate T, then the firm's after-tax profits are
where L is the quantity of labor input, w is the real wage rate, and F(L) is the production function. Maximization of profit implies
where F' is labor's marginal product. The representative worker's total real income, Y, equals wL + I, where I is nonlabor income. As in our previous paper, this income is spent on consumption, C, or on income taxes, T.2 In addition, there is now the worker's social security tax, Se -wL, where Se is the employee's (marginal and average) contribution rate. Thus we have Y = wL + I = C + T + Se(WL).
As before, income taxes, T, depend on taxable income, Y -D, where D is a broad concept of deductions. If utility depends positively on consumption and negatively on work, then the first-order condition for 2. For present purposes it is unnecessary for us to consider two categories of consumption-depending on the treatment by the tax law-as we did in the earlier paper. We also do not allow here for efforts aimed at avoiding income taxes. 
Previously, we calculated weighted averages, T', of the marginal income tax rates, T'. We weighted either by adjusted gross income or by numbers of returns, and we computed arithmetic and geometric averages. Here we consider only the series that we focused on earlier, which is the arithmetic average weighted by adjusted gross income. where Sf, Se, and sS are now the social security contribution rates for persons with earnings below the taxable ceiling;6 Q1 is the ratio to aggregate adjusted gross income of the wage and salary income of workers with earnings below the ceiling; Q2 is the corresponding ratio for self-employed persons; and "' is the (weighted) average marginal tax rate for workers with earnings below the ceiling. Table 1 For subsequent purposes the important variable is Q1, the ratio to adjusted gross income of the salaries and wages of persons below the ceiling. This ratio can be divided into two parts-first, the ratio of salaries and wages of persons below the ceiling to the aggregate of salaries and wages (col. 2 of table 1) and, second, the ratio of aggregate salaries and wages to aggregate adjusted gross income. The latter ratio is highly stable about its mean value of .84. Hence Q1 fluctuates mainly because of changes in the fraction of overall salaries and wages that accrue to persons below the ceiling. This fraction depends in turn on the ceiling earnings for social security in relation to the distribution of nominal earnings in the economy. For example, the decrease in fQ1 from .46 in 1937 to .24 in 1965 corresponds to a decline in the ratio of salaries and wages for persons below the ceiling to total salaries and wages from .57 to .29. This behavior reflects the relatively slow rise in the dollar ceiling on earnings, which increased from $3,000 in 1937 to only $4,800 in 1965. However, the ceiling has advanced rapidly since 1965, reaching $35,700 in 1983. Correspondingly, the ratio of salaries and wages for persons below the ceiling to total salaries and wages went from .29 in 1965 to .68 in 1983. This change led to an increase in Q1 from .24 in 1965 to .57 in 1983.
II. Computations of Tax Rates
5. To get the last term we approximate T'/(1 + Sf) T'(1 -Sf) in (6). This approximation is satisfactory for our data sample.
6. Note that the social security levy is a flat-rate tax in this range. It is more complicated to calculate the final term of equation (8), which depends on the average marginal tax rate T" for workers with earnings below the ceiling. From the IRS's Statistics of Income, Individual Tax Returns for each year, we approximated "' by using the marginal tax rates and associated values of adjusted gross income for the following filing units. First, we take all returns from income classes for which the average of salaries and wages per return is below the ceiling value. (For example, for 1980, when the ceiling on earnings is $25,900, we go up to an adjusted gross income per return of $30,000.) We then include enough additional joint returns from income classes where the average of salaries and wages per return is above the ceiling so as to exhaust the known total of salaries and wages that accrues to persons with earnings below the ceiling. However, we carry out this calculation by using the lowest possible income classes; that is, we assume that low numbers for individuals' salaries and wages correspond to low numbers for adjusted gross income per return. There is some approximation here since some of the low values for salaries and wages may come from either multiearner families or families with high nonlabor income, which would have high marginal tax rates. But some experimentation indicates that the potential error is quantitatively unimportant. Column 4 of table 2 shows the resulting calculation for the final term, -QlsfT"I, in equation (8). Note that this term, which reflects the exclusion of firms' social security payments from workers' taxable income, is always below .01 in magnitude.
Our The overall effect from social security on the average marginal tax rate is always much less than the rate of employees below the ceiling, (Sf + se)I(l + Sf). Primarily, this difference arises because Q1-the ratio of salaries and wages below the ceiling to aggregate adjusted gross income-is much less than unity. As mentioned before, the variations in Ql derive mainly from changes in the ratio of salaries and wages below the ceiling to total salaries and wages, which appears in column raised from social security divided by the contribution of this levy to the overall average marginal tax rate,7 expressed as a ratio to the corresponding figure for the income tax. On this basis the social security tax looks strikingly more efficient. Specifically, in 1983 the social security levy generates 2.5 times as much revenue per unit of average marginal tax rate as does the income tax, whereas in 1965 the corresponding number was 4.3. The main reason for the decline in this number since 1965 is the sharp rise in the ceiling on earnings, which has a positive effect on the average marginal tax rate from social security, relative to the revenue generated.
The social security levy turns out to be relatively "efficient" because it combines two features of a tax-rate schedule that have been stressed in the literature on optimal taxation. First, it is a flat-rate levy (on labor earnings and income from self-employment) in the range where the tax rate is positive. The shift to a flat-rate income tax has been proposed by, among others, Friedman (1962, ch. 10) and Hall and Rabushka (1983) . (Surprisingly, these authors do not seem to mention that, in the social security tax, we already have a close approximation to the flat-rate income tax.) In comparison with a graduated-rate system, the flat-rate levy generates the same amount of revenues at a lower average marginal tax rate. Second, as advocated on theoretical grounds by Mirrlees (1971) , the social security tax has a zero marginal rate at the top. However, as noted before, the rapid increase of the ceiling in recent years has made this feature less important than it used to be.
